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A B S T R A C T 
Three processes of stimulation or • contraction of 
the world economy have been distinguished in the paper : 
the Kahn-Keynes multiplier process, the Fisher-Kalecki 
debt process, and the Prebisch-Singer terms of trade 
process. The inequalities of world income distribution 
and the asymmetries of effects of expansion in incomes in 
different economic groupings foul up the expansionary 
potential of the multiplier process and dim the prospects 
of global Keynesianism. Inequalities in the distribution 
of assets as between different countries and within 
countries lie at the heart of the pulsations caused by the 
debt process. Finally, the great division of the world 
between poor, less developed countries and the affluent 
OECD block partly rests on and partly propels the 
Prebisch-Singer debt process. A synergistic interaction 
between the three processes pushing the world economy 
forward is continually impeded by the Janus-faced 
character of capital : as finance it demands unhindered 
mobility and as a productivity-raising agent it requires 
embedding in a country, in an organization, in a 
production site and in a committed managerial and 
entrepreneurial cadre. 
Fluctuations in global economy : income 
debt and terms of trade processes 
1. The need to study global processes of expansion 
From the 1850s until now, the global economy has 
undergone several long stretches (spanning at least 7 to 8 
years each, that is, the length of the socalled Juglar 
cycle) of expansion and contraction. In the phases of 
contraction or expansion, the fates of a number of 
countries have been exceptions to those o f t h e majority of 
economies. The exceptions, especially in periods of 
contraction, have often been the trend-setters and have 
often framed new rules of the game. Thus, for example, 
during the socalled Great Depression starting in the 
1870s, Germany and the USA began to forge ahead as the 
trend-setters for the whole capitalist world (see, for 
example, Saul, 1969). The losers were mainly highly 
populated, dependent or semi-dependent countries such as 
India and China, and many countries of Africa as well. 
Buz the losers happened to contain many more people than 
the exceptional trend-setters. Similarly, during the 
other great depression of the 1930s, Japan, the Soviet 
Union and many less developed countries of Latin America 
adopted various measures of government intervention, 
including central planning, and were able to escape the 
severe drop in employment and income that characterized 
the U.K. or Germany (The demand stimulation in Germany 
with the Nazi .military programme helped her to provide 
jcbs for the boys, but at considerably lower real wages 
than before, thanks to the severe suppression of workers' 
rights (Lurie, 1947) ). 
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The third great depression during the century and 
a half since the Crystal Palace exhibition of 1851 - the 
depression starting in 1981 - is still with us, and does 
not yet show signs of going away. Again, several 
economies, mainly those of East and South East Asia, 
including Japan and the People's Republic of China as well 
'as the four dragons and the NICs of the ASEAN, have 
escaped a sustained contraction in this phase. Until 
1990, India was also somewhat of an exception. However, 
most other countries of Latin America and Africa have 
experienced nothing short of ecocide - a long-drawn-out 
contraction in incomes, running down of the productive 
apparatus, and a severe deterioration of the environment -
during this phase. 
Throughout all these phases of contraction or 
expansion, forces cf international competitiveness have 
gone on working to put some countries ahead of others, 
relatively speaking. Many of these forces are long-term 
in nature, having to do with rates of long-term 
investment, the discovery and use of new technologies, 
innovations in business organization, and new strategies 
of government-business interaction. I will not deal with 
such long-term factors except in so far as they are 
germane to questions cf short-term movements. Relative 
prices and real exchange rates are also instruments in the 
game of international competitiveness. However, by 
definition, such instruments cannot be used to stimulate 
all economies of the world, although, as many economists 
have argued before (see, e.g. Robinson, 1947), the attempt 
by many countries to use such instruments can lead to a 
contraction of the real incomes of all the countries taken 
together. Since adjustments in real exchange rates, 
including measures of devaluation cannot, therefore, be 
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recommended as a general prescription for the world as 
whole, I will also largely leave aside the consideration 
of such issues. However, there are situations in which 
while the basic rules of the game provide for a global 
expansion, individual countries that suffer fron 
misalignments of their exchange rates can be 
helped to realign their foreign exchange rates. This was 
in fact the arrangement that was envisaged under _he 
Bretton Wood system. 
Of the three processes I have picked out for 
analysis in this paper, two are assumed to work without 
necessitating any systematic changes in the structure of 
relative prices (including exchange rates). These two are 
(a) the Kahn - Keynes - Kalecki income multiplier process 
as extended to the world economy by Harrod, Metzler, 
Goodwin, Chipman and others, and (b) the process cf credit 
creation and its extension to the world economy as 
embodied in the agreements leading to the Bretton Woods 
pystem. These two will be analysed on the assumption that 
the relative prices of commodities remain unchanged or 
change slowly and in a random manner. However, the third 
process involves systematic changes in terms of trade 
between the advanced, industrialized countries, and the 
less developed countries (LDCs), dependent on either 
primary products or crude manufactured goods for their 
export earnings. These systematic changes are separately 
analysed, for, they have a very definite bearing on the 
aggregate expenditures, on inflationary price rises and 
expectations relating to investment for the world economy 
as a whole and not just for the LDCs. 
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It is hoped that a conceptual separation of these 
processes will help us understand how much of their 
working can be taken to be 'automatic' in any useful sense 
and how much they are affected by various kinds of 
national policy and by international public intervention 
of different kinds. A comprehensive treatment will, of 
course, require a book rather than an article. But an 
indication of some of the important ways in which the 
processes are affected by policy choices will show up the 
role of explicit public and transnational intervention in 
blocking or fashioning linkages between the three 
processes. This will serve to emphasize the asymmetric 
roles played by actors with different degrees of power, 
and by imperfect and short-sighted cartellization of 
economic power by a few global leaders including the 
leading OECD governments, the IMF and the World Bank, and 
by a handful of transnational corporations (TNCs) whose 
interests influence the decisions of these policy leaders 
and finally, the relative futility of the efforts of even 
these policy leaders to stimulate the global economy so 
long as they refuse to recognize the frequency and 
pervasiveness of conflicts between short and long-term 
goals and i tween the demand of capital as finance and of 
capital as the controller of productivity - augmenting 
institutions. The special problems created by the 
two-way mobility of capital as between most LDCs and the 
OECD countries and the immobility of labour as between 
different countries will be treated in the final section 
of the paper. 
2. The expenditure multiplier in the global context 
and asymmetries of economic power 
The income-expenditure multiplier had a number of 
precursors before its canonical formulation in Kahn 
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(1931). Kahn (1984) has disclaimed that he could be 
0 
considered to be the real begetter of Keynes' General 
Theory (1936). Nonetheless, Kahn's article still reads 
as if it was a conscious application of Keynesian 
macroeconomics to the discussion of the impact of an 
increase in expenditure on public works. The importance 
of the supply conditions of consumption goods, the 
implication of a rise in wages in response to an increase 
in the demand for labour, the critical importance of a 
banking policy -as to whether or not credit is tightened 
whenever prices rise (Kahn, 1931, p.3), _the variation 
in impact on employment with variations in the size of 
the 'dole' in relation to the wage of an average worker, 
and the 'alleviation' to the increase in purchasing 
power resulting from an increased dose of investment in 
the presence of imports of consumption goods and raw 
materials (Kahn, 1931, p. 5) are all there in Kahn's 
analysis. Moreover, Kahn also clearly recognized that an 
increase in world prosperity could cause a rise in 
autonomous expenditure in the form of exports to other 
countries and th^s could have a greater impact on 
employment (and, according to Kahn, prices) than an 
isolated increase in investment in a single country 
(Ibid. pp. 6 _7_) 
Kahn also recognized that 
A perfectly closed system ... is the world as a 
whole. It follows, as is indeed quite obvious, 
that an international policy of 'public works' 
would be far more efficacious from the point of 
each separate country than a purely local policy. 
(Kahn, 1931. p. 13). 
In a way, the triad of institutions Keynes tried to 
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design in the 1940s - the International Trade 
Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development -
was meant to serve the cause of international public 
works whenever unemployment went beyond acceptable 
levels, without jeopardising the prospects of growth in 
the world economy (cf. JMK, 1980a and 1980b; and 
Williamson, 1981). As we know, the Keynes Plan was only 
very partially realized, and the system that he deisgned 
was ultimately turned on its head : the pursuit of price 
stability and facilitating adjustment to the working of 
markets and not the pursuit of full employment and world 
prosperity have become the watchwords of the IMF and the 
World Bank. 
Besides Kahn's pathbreaking article (and Meade's 
contribution to it) there were other early, brilliant 
applications of the concept of the foreign trade 
multiplier in Harrod's International Economics (1933). 
But a generalization of the concept of the foreign trade 
multiplier to that of an international expenditure 
multiplier had to wait for the work of Machlup (1943), 
Metzler, Goodwin and Chipman, in the decade ending in 
1950. The re-interpretation of the 
Metzler-Goodwin-Chipman interregional or intersectoral 
multiplier as an international matrix multiplier is a 
straightforward process provided that fixed exchange rates, 
and accommodating monetary policy and international 
capital transfers can be assumed to hold (Metzler, 
1942a, 1942b, 1950; Goodwin, 1949; Chipman, 1951) ( 1 ) . 
In a recent exercise, Goodwin (1980) divided the 
world into a small number of blocks such as the USA or 
t I 
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North America, EEC, Japan etc. and then worked out the 
increases in exogenous or autonomous expenditure that 
would be needed so as to raise world incomes by specified 
percentages or amounts, calculated in a common 
international currency such as the still-born 'bancor' 
(Goodwin, 1980). Since there were unused capacities and 
idle hands in virtually all countries, in principle, all 
of them would experience increases in income and 
expenditure as a result of such global Keynesianism. 
Since the aggregate deficit of the countries suffering 
balance of payments deficits on current account must 
balance the aggregate current account surplus of the 
countries experiencing a balance of payments surplus, and 
since the latter would have experienced a net increase in 
their incomes, it should be possible for the surplus 
countries to sustain the income expansion process of the 
deficit countries by making transfer payments as gifts or 
long-term loans. But as Keynes (1980a, 1980b) had 
recognized in his plans for an international clearing 
union, there is nothing in the usual processes of balance 
of payments adjustment under a fixed exchange rate regime 
that would compel the surplus countries to make such 
transfer payments to deficit countries or to reflate 
their economies in the first place if such reflation 
seemed to militate against their other domestic or 
international policy objectives. He had sought to levy a 
charge or interest on the credit balances of the surplus 
countries with the proposed international clearing union 
or central bank if they exceeded certain limits. (Keynes, 
1980a;Harrod, 1951, pp. 542-548). Eventually, Article 
VII of the articles of agreement for the International 
Monetary Fund embodied the socalled 'scarce currency' clause 
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this meant that if the IMF declared the currency of a 
particular country to be scarce, then all other member 
countries could impose limitations on the freedom cf 
exchange operations in the " scarce currency. This 
provision, however, remained a dead letter in operation : 
deficit countries faced penalties in various forms so 
that even if a currency was scarce in effect, the deficit 
countries as a group could never avail of the 'scarce 
currency' clause (Tew, 1967, p. 96). Thus the pessimism 
. /(1947) . . . of Joan RobinsCn/regarding the possibility of avoiding 
beggar-my-neighbour policies and their contractionary 
consequences seemed to be eminently justified especially 
after the dollar had gone off gold and foreign exchange 
rates were allowed to float. The ironical fact is that 
it is the IMF which effectively enforces 
beggar-my-neighbour policies on countries plagued with 
chronic balance-of payments difficulties. 
The manipulation of the IMF policies for short-run 
advantages by the U.S.A. and some of its close allies 
derives its rationale from asymmetries in the impact cf 
global Keynesianism on expenditure flows as well as fran 
considerations of retaining the levers of power in the 
hands , of transnational banks and transnational 
corporations in a world of free capital mobility arri. 
restricted mobility of commodities and labour. Tbe 
unequal distribution of benefits of changes in autonomous 
expenditures results from (a) the initial unequal 
distribution of incomes between different countries, (b) 
differences in the composition of the outputs of tbe 
different countries as regards tradables and nontradables 
and (c) differences in marginal propensities to save ard 
import as between different countries. A number cf 
simulations have been made of the effect on national 
expenditure and income flows of one per cent increase in 
government expenditures in the U.S.A. (and in Germany and 
Japan). The effects naturally take time to work 
themselves out but the impact diminishes quickly over 
time. Hence the income multipliers are given as in the 
second year after the increase in government 
expenditures. In Tables 1 and 2 we reproduce the results 
of two sets of simulations. The asymmetrical nature of 
the impact is most obvious in Table 1. From Table 2 it 
would appear that the international repercussion effects 
of a fiscal expansion in the U.S.A. and the rest of the 
OECD (ROECD) are about the same. But we must remember 
that the simulations behind Table 2 are based on the 
assumption that the ROECD which include Japan as well as 
the U.K., Italy, Denmark and other Western European 
countries can coordinate their policies. As the recent 
difficulties faced in ratifying the Maastricht treaty and in 
keeping the lira, the pound and the franc within the 
limits of the ERM band have demonstrated, such 
coordination itself would require considerable political 
determination. 
Table 1 International multipliers for the 
U.S.A., and Japan 
Initiating country 
Effect on 
U.S.A 
Japan 
Germany 
Canada 
U.S.A. 
1.7 
1.3 
0.4 
1.0 
Japan 
0.1 
1.3 
0.2 
0.1 
Germany 
0.1 
0.1 
1.3 
0.0 
Source : H. Edison, J. Marquez and R. Tryon, 'The 
structure and properties of the Federal 
Reserve Board multicountry model', 
£conomic Modelling, April, 1987; as 
quoted in Dornbusch and Fischer, 1990, 
p.194. 
Table 2 International multipliers for the 
U.S.A. and R'OECD (the rest of the 
OECD) (in percentages of national 
or regional income) 
Initiating country or region 
Effect on 
U.S.A. 
ROECD 
U.S.A. 
1.2 
0.3 
ROECD 
0 . 2 
1.5 
Source : Fischer, 1988, p.16 
We have assumed that increases in expenditure in 
all the economies take place through autonomous increases 
in government expenditure or in private investment. But 
different economies face different kinds of constraints in 
respect of fiscal expansion; and in any case autonomous 
increases in private investment cannot be brought about by 
an official fiat. Hence it must be hypothesised that some 
economies would be stimulated through monetary and some 
through fiscal expansion. However, either policy could 
change the relative international competitive position of 
different countries, bring about significant changes in 
exchange rates and lead to trade and investment flows 
tending to upset the calculations made on the basis of an 
initial set of exchange rates and relative international 
prices. For example, if the USA sought to stimulate the 
economy not by an increase in government expenditure but 
via the path of monetary expansion, that is, by lowering 
the rate of interest and allowing banks to extend larger 
amounts of credit (and thus allowing the money supply to 
be expanded), it would lead to a depreciation of the 
dollar and expand U.S. trade at the cost of competing 
countries which experienced an appreciation in the foreign 
exchange value of their currencies (Fischer, 1988, p. 16 
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and Dornbusch and Fischer, 1990, p. 194). if the U.S. 
competitors do not adopt compensatory measures to protect 
their net exports, then the net ef-fect for the world 
economy might be contractionary rather than expansionary. 
Paradoxically enough, if the close competitors of the 
U.S.A. in foreign trade did undertake compensatory 
policies, then the net effect might be contractionary for 
ail of them. For much of the 1980s, the U.S.A. in any 
case sought to attract capital from abroad to meet the 
large and generally increasing deficit in her balance of 
payments. Thus the policies of the U.S. government (and 
other governments) in respect of operation of money and 
capital markets might upset most of the predictions 
derivable from global income multiplier models. 
There is- one particular aspect of the lack of 
policy coordination for economic expansion which seems to 
have attracted less attention than it deserves. Because 
the OECD countries (with the sole exception of Taiwan) are 
the major generators of mobilizable capital flows in the 
international economy and are also the major recipients of 
such capital flows, and because the OECD countries as a 
group form the biggest market for all products - primary 
commodities and manufactured products alike - it is 
possible for them to reach agreements on international 
financial policies and trade policies which minimize the 
cost of adjustment for themselves but which impose 
dead-weight losses on those countries which cannot 
participate in these negotiations. (The meetings of the 
G7 countries are the most striking examples of such 
exclusionary coalitions). Since the levers of control and 
operation of the global financial system rest with banks 
and coalitions located in OECD countries, and most IMF -
World Bank structural adjustment policies are imposed as 
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if they are addressed to the domestic policy delinquency 
of a single country, considerations of financial prudence 
almost always prevail over requirements of expansion. The 
structural adjustment policies are meant to limit the 
domestic absorption of the erring country and increase its 
exports. Since both the income and aggregate price 
elasticities of LDC exports are typically low, such 
policies give rise to an endemic contractionary tendency 
in the world economy. But in the meantime, some bank 
loans may be repaid and the exposure of OECD-based 
trasnational banks (TNBs) to the LDCs may have come down. 
Thus global Keynesianism becomes a victim of the narrow 
financial interests of a handful of TNBs and their 
influential clients in OECD countries. 
Of course, virtually all the major industrial 
countries also face severe problems in raising their 
rates of investment and productivity growth through either 
expansionary fiscal policies or expansionary monetary 
policies. But many of these problems - fear of rising 
real wages and burgeoning budget deficits - have their 
ultimate roots in their fear of losing in the race of 
international competitiveness with countries within the 
OECD block, and with a few countries outside the block. 
The fear and lack of willingness to commit themselves to a 
joint reflationary policy generate the kind of stagnation 
we have been witnessing in the global economy for more 
than a decade. 
The question has been asked as to how, in view of 
all these problems of keeping up with the Joneses among 
the major OECD countries, the global economy could have at 
all expanded in, say, the nineteenth century, or in the 
period 1945-1970 ? The answers given to these questions 
have been, of course, quite varied as between different 
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economists. One reason why in the pre-1914 period the 
world economy as a whole and not just the leading 
industrial countries is judged to have succeeded is that 
insufficient account has been taken of the performance of 
such major areas of the world as India, China and most of 
Black Africa. Many of these countries experienced major 
famines in the last thirty years of nineteenth century. 
But it may also be true that the international gold 
standard, by providing a reasonable degree of exchange 
stability for the major OECD countries made economic 
calculation less fraught with risk and provided a secure 
background for investment flows, especially to the 
white-inhabited colonies of the western hemisphere, 
Australia and New Zealand (cf. Nurkse, 1961, Lecture one, 
and Eichengreen, 1985b, p.9). However, the stability of 
exchange rates of the major OECD countries had as its 
counterpart the exchange instability of many countries of 
Latin America on an inconvertible paper currency, and 
countries on the silver standard such as India upto 1893, 
and China, and many other East and South-East Asian 
countries upto 1914 and beyond. It may even be argued 
that much of the burden of adjustment in the international 
economy in the late nineteenth century was passed on to 
the non-white colonies of European countries (Bagchi, 
1979 ) . 
Thus the only period that seems to have witnessed 
global Keynesianism on a world scale is that between the 
end of the Second World War and the floating of the dollar 
in 1971. The reasons why this was sustained over such a 
long period, and why the postwar boom came to an end are 
still matters of debate (see, for a sample of debates, 
Weisskopf, 1979, Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison, 1984; and 
Singer, 1989). It should be noted, first of all, that the 
stimulating impulses were very unevenly distributed across 
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countries at the best of times : for most LDCs, there was 
nothing on the scale of the Marshall Aid to western 
Europe, or the market-supporting strategies pursued in the 
case of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan by the U. S.A. and 
her allies. Even the spinoff effects of the U.S. 
involvement in the Korean and Vietnam War were confined to 
a few countries or city economies (such as Hong Kong, 
South Korea and Thailand). However, the competition 
between the two military and political superpowers, the 
USA and the USSR did provide a space for many LDCs to 
pursue essentially Keynesian policies, often buttressed by a 
large dose of protectionism. The co-operation between the 
major OECD countries was also made possible by the fact 
that up to the middle of the 1960s there was a large 
technological gap between the U.S.A. and her close allies 
in most of the dynamic sectors of the economy, and the 
could generate the surplus to sustain the process 
of transfer of technology to those allies. 
However, the very universality of the use of the 
dollar as the currency for international transactions and 
asset holdings ultimately made it seriously overvalued; 
the U.S.A. and British concentration of resources on 
military-related technologies allowed the two major 'free 
riders', namely, Germany and Japan, to steal a decisive 
march in many areas of civilian technology . continued 
full employment without the forging of a consensus on 
incomes policy unleashed rates of inflation which made 
economic calculations increasingly risky and led to 
unsustainable departures of the real exchange rates from 
their official values , and private hot money flows made 
balance of payments deficits increasingly disruptive. 
I am not trying to provide an exhaustive catalogue 
of all the factors that led to the collapse of the Bretton 
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Woods system and global Keynesiansim, however unevenly 
distributed over states and regimes that system might 
have been (for an account of the less-than-even handed 
treatment of LDCs by the IMF even when the Bretton Woods 
system was alive and kicking, see Konig, 1973 and Gulati, 
1980; for instances of the use of the World Bank as an 
instrument of imperial domination, see Hayter, 1971). 
What I am suggesting is that the collapse of the 
coordinated system of economic management put in place at 
Bretton Woods was connected with asymmetries of economic 
power which changed over time and seemed to require new 
rules for coordination of economic policies - rules which 
have yet to be formulated although the earlier system 
collapsed more than twenty years ago. 
3. The credit stimulation and the debt deflation process 
in the global economy 
If Keynes is credited with the building of the 
edifice of the theory of aggregate output, and employment 
on foundations provided by Kahn, Meade and others, he 
also was the theorist par excellence of the complexity of 
money as an institution of a modern, capitalist economy. 
Analysis of the role credit institutions play in 
stimulating economic activity and correspondingly the way 
a disruption of credit can disturb real economic activity 
has a hoary history. David Hume (1752b) 
theorized about the way paper credit economised 
on metallic money. He also argued that increase 
of commerce and industry would tend to lower the 
rate of interest and hence encourage enterprise on the 
part of potential borrowers (Hume, 1752a). Credit 
institutions figured as major facilitating forces in 
Schumpeter's theory of economic development (see, for 
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example Schumpeter, 1911; Bellofiore, 1985). Keynes was 
by and large an advocate of cheap money most of his life. 
The raising of the British bank rate from 3 to 4 per cent 
in 1923 provoked him to write one of his most memorable 
philippics against that conservative institution, the Bank 
of England (Keynes, 1923a as quoted by Harrod, 1951, p. 
338). Keynes was an advocate of cheap money policy during 
the Second World War, and Harrod credits Keynes with the 
change in climate of opinion that allowed the Second World 
War to be fought with^fong term rate of interest at 3 per 
cent as against the 5 per cent that prevailed during the 
First World War (Harrod, 1951, p. 492-93). Keynes was in 
this respect in tune with most of his academic colleagues 
(Sayers, 1956, pp. 153-162), but he had done much to mould 
the pro-cheap money opinion of the 1930s. However, in the 
light of Keynes' de-emphasis on monetary tinkering as a 
way of stimulating economic activity, it is fair to 
conclude that he regarded a cheap money policy as part of 
the environment of expectations that allowed expansionary 
policies to be pursued in a situation of unempldyment, or 
resources to be mobilized and utilized in appropriate 
directions (war financing, for example) rather than as an 
instrument for economic expansion on its own. (This would 
be true even if a 'liquidity trap' was not encountered at 
a low rate of interest). 
The impact of credit shock or credit stringency on 
macroeconomic conditions such as prices, output or 
employment was also known to many economists and 
publicists. Veblen (1904) and Hawtrey (1913, 1919, 1928) 
were among the first group of economists who had 
attributed a major role to debt deflation in. causing 
fluctuations in aggregate activity (Bigg, 1987; Gertler, 
1988). In his Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) Keynes 
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analysed the instability of credit in causing declines in 
activity and employment in postwar Europe. 
In the Tract, which was mostly an updated and 
expanded version of Keynes1 articles in the Reconstruction 
Supplements of the Manchester Guardian Commercial 
(published between April and July 1922), Keynes discussed 
the relation between money and real rates of interest, and 
eloquently described the differential effects of inflation 
and deflation - the former tending to impoverish the 
'investors', that is, the rentiers, the latter tending to 
ruin the businessmen and the workers( who suffered 
unemployment). He clso showed how the borrowers would try 
to beat inflation by borrowing more and more; but 
ultimately, if the rate of inflation went out of hand, 
they could end up being without any credit or wealth. 
(All this anticipates much of the discussion on the 
Phillips curve and the essence of the claims made by the 
rational expectations school without their absurdities). 
However, Keynes was concerned here and later on in.the 
Treatise with questions of stability of the price level 
and the best way to regulate the supply of money and 
institutions of credit rather than with analysing the 
consequences of a collapse of credit or a process of debt 
deflation as such. The state of credit was an essential 
part of the business environment which entered into 
calculations of marginal efficiency of capital in the 
General Theory. However, in the ensuing debates, and in 
the neoclassical synthesis which long passed for Keynesian 
economics, especially among U.S. economists, the 
complexities of the credit market were swept under in the 
often sterile debate about the exact role of the stock of 
money, and the causal relation between money and output. 
There were, of course, major exceptions, not only 
among the Cambridge Keynesians such as Kahn, Kaldor and 
Joan Robinson, and the authors of the Report of the 
Radcliffe Committee (1959) but also among U.S. economists 
such as James Tobin, and Hyman Minsky, who regarded money 
only as the leading asset among a number of assets, mainly 
differing in terms of the degree of liquidity, which 
itself would vary with the state of expectation. But it 
probably remains true that the consequences of changes in 
the state of credit as against those in expectations 
regarding fiscal policy or changes in output were not 
fully teased out in the literature in the.major Keynesian 
•'tradition. This is where it seems that Irving Fisher's 
attempt to explain the depression of the 1930s (Fisher, 
1932, 1933) has stimulated new analysis of the 
macroeconomic consequences of changes in the state of 
credit. A number of younger economists, such as Ben 
Bernanke, Alan Blinder, N. Gregory Mankiw, G. Rich, J.E. 
Stiglitz, A. Weiss, and others, working on empirical data 
relating to the prewar gold standard and to the experience 
of the 1930s in the U.S.A. and Canada, and building on 
insights from the literature on uncertainty and asymmetric 
information have striven to find out the possible 
influence of changes in the state of credit on aggregate 
economic activity. Much of this work is also highly 
relevant for understanding the consequences of the 
international debt trap most LDCs have been embroiled in 
since 1981. 
Fisher suggested that the depression of the 1930s 
was exacerbated, if not caused in the first place, by the 
process of debt deflation. The burden of debt on firms 
and individuals and the effects of bank failures and 
bankrupt cies led to decline in expenditures and 
contraction of the credit that might otherwise have 
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allowed firms and individuals to get over a temporary fall 
in income or cash flow. Although Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963) attributed a causal role to the contraction of 
money supply in the precipitation and prolongation of the 
depression of the 1930s in the U.S.A. , they failed to 
substantiate their opinion by means of a plausible 
theoretical model. 
The recent revival of academic interest in the 
market for credit and in debt or credit crisis as causal 
influences on the ebb and flow of real incomes is the 
_-esult of a convergence of three different streams of 
work. The f i r s t h a n d chronologically the oldest, is some 
new work on the functioning Qf the gold and gold exchange 
standards, and re-interpretation of older writings in the 
light of new theoretical (including Keynesian) insights. 
The second is a stream of writings on the microeconomics 
of credit markets and of the working of firms in the 
presence of asymmetric information and principal-agent 
problems, and extension of that work to take in the 
probable consequences for macroeconomic activity. The 
third stream is the work initiated by Mishkin (1978) and 
Bernanke (1983) on the interpretation of empirical data 
(mainly pertaining to the U.S. experience) bearing on 
debts of firms and individuals, bank failures, and 
fluctuations in aggregate national income and employment. 
We shall take up the second of these three strands 
first. Economists have long been aware that neither the 
money market nor the capital market can be perfect. The 
reasons are basically to be found in three factors. The 
first is that money markets and capital markets are 
foward-looking in time and therefore inevitably involve 
risk and uncertainty. The second is that perceptions of 
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risk and uncertainty are generally different as between 
different entities and tend to vary systematicaly as 
between lenders and borrowers or as between suppliers and 
users of capital in general. Thirdly, there are 
systematic differences between economic agents as regards 
their ability to cope with risk and uncertainty : the 
value of collateral or security for a loan is one way of 
judging this ability. But in the case of many borrowers 
it is better represented by the goodwill of the firm or 
the individual. The imperfection in the capital market is 
expressed not simply by, say, a declining cost of capital 
for big rather than small borrowers, but more importantly, 
by other conditions surrounding a loan such as the 
frequency or stringency of monitoring by a lender, the 
insistence on or omission of the explicit hypothecation of 
the collateral, and most importantly for our purposes, the 
rationing of credit to different borrowers at the same 
nominal rate of interest. 
Kalecki (1954) had already considered constraints 
on the entrepreneur's ability to raise outside capital or 
loans imposed by the value of his capital. He had also 
hypothesized that the individual firm or the controlling 7 a 
group of/joint-stock company would associate an increase 
in the size of the loan taken by it with an increase in 
risk of loss of initial capital or of control over^lirm. 
But these considerations had been brought in by him only 
for specifying the investment function and not for 
analysing the money or credit markets as such. In Keynes' 
discussion of degrees of liquidity of different assets in 
Chapter 17 of the General Theory, there is an implicit 
recognition that the markets for different kinds of assets 
may be imperfect (see for a useful discussion, Minsky, 
19 75, Chapter 4). Imperfection of the capital market in 
the sense of its inability to convey full information 
about the relative profitability of different investment 
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projects and the necessity of bears and bulls to 
systematically differ in their perception of likely 
movements of bond and share prices underlie Keynes' 
formalisation of the speculative motive for the demand for 
money (Kahn, 1954). But most of this analysis was swep4-
under in his attempt to formalize the liquidity preference 
theory of the rate of interest and demonstrate the 
generality of underemployment equilibria in an economy in 
which money plays an essential role in bridging the 
present and the future. (We may guess that the Central 
role played by the Bank Rate in Britain and the success of 
the Bank of England as a lender of last resort made Keynes 
ignore the possibility of bank credit and supply of money 
by commercial banks putting further spokes in the wheel of 
the automatic stabilization mechanism favoured by the 
preKeynesian neoclassical theorists, but I would not go 
further at this stage in verifying that guess). 
The new work in this area first concerned the 
microeconomics of the credit market. Jaffee and Russell 
(1976) basically took up Kalecki's argument from the point 
of view of the lender and showed that under a wide variety 
of circumstances the probability of default increases 
with loan size. Moreover, borrowers differ in their 
ability and willingness to repay. Lenders cannot sore 
out the good projects from bad ones and bad borrowers 
from good by increasing only the rate of interest. The 
bad borrowers would promise to repay and default 
and the good borrowers would have to pay a premium - a 
'lemons' premium, (to borrow from the terminology used by 
Akerlof (1970)) to cover the greater risk of default of 
bad borrowers. The lenders then find it optimal to resort 
to credit rationing in order to screen out the really 
risky projects and limit the damage caused by bad 
borrowers. In a later paper, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
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built on this analysis to sharpen the result that credit 
rationing is the natural outcome of a situation in which 
the lenders do not have any a priori or at least cheap 
method of sorting out the bad from the good borrowers, or 
the bad from the good projects. In Jaffee and Russell's 
analysis the bank could use the amount of collateral 
* demanded to sort out the good from the bad borrowers. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, p. 249) showed that 
increasing the collateral requirement of lenders 
(beyond some point) may decrease the returns to 
the bank by either decreasing the average degree 
of risk aversion of the pool of borrowers or, in a 
multi-period model, including individual 
investors to undertake riskier projects. 
Consequently, it may not be profitable to 
raise the interest rate or collateral repayments 
when a bank has an excess demand for credit. 
Instead, banks deny loans to borrowers who are 
observationally indistinguishable from those who 
receive loans. 
Other analysts have followed the same line of 
reasoning and shown that in the presence of incomplete and 
asymmetric information and costly monitoring the market 
for credit can be imperfect in many different ways. For 
example, Mankiw (1986) showed that in the market for for 
student loans (or it could be the market/loans for new 
technology in agriculture), a rate of interest that would 
allow the banks to recover their outlay (with bad or 
dishonest students being effectively subsidized by good or 
honest students), might easily lead to the collapse of the 
market. He also showed that it might be socially 
beneficial then for the government to subsidize credit so 
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as to bring down the cost of credit to good borrowers (and 
also, of course, to bad borrowers). 
A similar kind of reasoning can be used to 
demonstrate that share prices at any moment of time are at 
best incomplete indicators of the true worth of a firm. 
It would also indicate why while financial intermediaries 
can be used to gather and convey specialized information 
about the profitability of particular projects and firms, 
neither elaborate financial intermediation nor 
securitization can qet rid of what has been called the 
problem of 'costly state verification' (Townsend, 1979). 
These imperfections at the level of firms and 
banks, borrowers and lenders can build up into 
macroeconomic forces that cause disturbances to aggregate 
economic activity when an external shock occurs, or vhen 
there is a change in a crucial policy parameter such as 
the Bank rate or the stringency of selective credit 
control. In a model constructed by Blinder (1987), 
production is entirely dependent on bank credit, and a 
contraction in credit can lead to a larger decline in 
output than in aggregate demand (since the latter is 
smaller than total income by the fraction of the marginal 
propensity to save) and price rises to clear the market. 
Thus a stagflationary situation is brought about by credit 
contraction. Of course, when interest is a large element 
in cost, and the rate of interest rises, cost-push can 
cause an inflationary price rise along with a fall in 
output : output can fall in a competitive market where 
producers do not expect to pass on the increase in costs 
or it can fall because tighter credit means rationing out 
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a part of the output which is dependent on loans for 
working capital. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) have 
constructed a model in which bonds and bank loans are 
imperfect substitutes, and with unchanged returns on 
bonds, changes in the rate of interest on bank loans or in 
total credit extended by banks would affect aggregate 
output. 
The analysis of Canadian data, by contrast with 
Bernanke's analysis (Bernanke, 1983) of US data, failed to 
turn up evidence of an independent influence of credit 
crunch or bank failures on the degree or duration of the 
depression in that country (Haubrich, 1990). At first 
sight, this is surprising because Canada's was a much weaker 
economy than that of the U.S.A. and Canada did not have a 
central bank at all until 1935. The weakness of the 
Canadian economy was demonstrated by the influence exerted 
by international factors, and especially by the U.S. 
depression in causing business failures and deepening the 
recession in Canada. But the lack of a Canadian central 
bank was compensated for by a strong system of branch 
banking and by the willingness of the government to 
provide virtually unlimited liquidity to banks with assets 
but faced with a liquidity crisis (Haubrich, 1990; 
Drummond, 1991). A spate of amalgamations in the 1920s 
left Canada with a handful of banks with branches spanning 
most regions of the country and with diversified 
portfolios. These banks were also subject to a careful 
system of monitoring by the government and their charters 
had to be renewed every ten years. Under an Act passed in 
August 1914, the Dominion government had to provide banks 
with Dominion currency notes against the pledge of 
virtually any assets they had to offer. Thus the Canadian 
government acted as an effective lender of last resort. 
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We will now briefly refer to that part of the 
working of the gold standard which throws light on the way 
in which the operation of the credit mechanism had, in the 
pre-second World War period, influenced the start or the 
propagation of expansionary and contractionary movements 
in the world economy and its constituent parts. It had 
been pointed out already by numerous analysts such as 
Keynes (1913, 1930), Whale (1937) and others that the 
pre-first World War gold standard was not an automatic 
mechanism working through inflows and outflows of specie 
changing price levels in countries with balance of trade 
surpluses and deficits; it often involved the active 
intervention of the monetary authorities in the major gold 
standard countries to sterilize the effect of gold 
movements or block an anticipated outflow of gold. The 
critical role of the credit policy of the same monetary 
authorities, and especially of the Bank of England, had 
already been stressed by these analysts. Later economists 
such as Ford (1960) and Triffin (1964) pointed out that as 
far as exporters of primary commodities were concerned, 
the Bank rate changes in the London money market had an 
opposite effect to what the specie-flow-price mechanism 
predicted. The loss gold from England induced the 
Bank of England to raise the Bank rate; this in turn led 
to a stringency of credit for imports of primary 
commodities (London being the largest importer, entrepot 
or clearing centre for the international trade in such 
commodities) and a fall in their prices in comparison with 
the prices of manufactures of industrial goods. Such a 
development was connected with the fact that as Kalecki 
(1954) put it, primary commodity prices were 
demand-determined whereas industrial prices were 
cost-determined, or as Hicks (1965) put it later, the 
markets for primary commodities were flex-price markets 
-26-
whereas the markets for manufactures were fix-price 
markets. Credit contraction in the major gold standard 
countries could then have an effect in transmitting 
contractionary impulses especially to those countries 
whose incomes were overwhelmingly derived from the 
production of primary commodities. 
The interesting point is that not all those 
countries whose exports consisted mainly of primary 
products in the late nineteenth century derived their 
income mainly from agriculture. Thus while Canada and 
Australia were chiefly exporters of primary products, they 
already derived the major part of their national income 
from non-agricultural sectors of the economy (Kuznets, 
1971, Chapter IV). Thus it is probable that the effect of 
the credit policy of the advanced capitalist countries was 
less severe in these countries than in the non-white 
colonies whose incomes were overwhelmingly derived from 
the agricultural sector. On the other hand, Rich (1988) 
has argued that the reserve-ratio policy of the chartered 
banks of Canda tended to aggravate business fluctuations, 
originating from external shocks : a fall in the interest 
rate and an expansion in export incomes would be attended 
by a lowering of the cash-reserve ratio and lead to an 
expansion of bank credit and money supply through the 
credit multiplier. A rise in international interest rates 
and contraction in exports would have the opposite 
effect. 
As far as Canada was concerned (and this probably 
also applies to Australia or South Africa in the same 
period) international capital movements were not sensitive 
to interest rate differentials (Dick and Floyd, 1991; 
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Redish, 1991) but were determined by long-term factors 
such as the pulsations of European migration and 
preferences of the British investor (Piatt, 1985). Thus 
the question of impact of credit policy in the 
international context cannot be divorced from questions of 
relations of dependence or underdevelopment in the 
international economy (cf. Darity, Jr., 1987 and Marcel 
and Palma, 1988) . 
The recent theoretical and empirical work on 
internal and international adjustments to credit shocks 
brings into question many of the -policies imposed on the 
less developed as well as developed countries in the name 
of sound banking or financial liberalization. Modern 
banks originally operated almost exclusively in what Okun 
(1981) called customer markets : this is how small local 
banks still operate in most countries. Some banks, mostly 
with government encouragement,- if not with explicit or 
implicit subsidy, entered into a long-term relationship 
with their customers, fostering industry, giving working 
capital loans for growing cash crops, tying loans to the 
introduction of new technology and facilitating the 
invasion and penetration of export markets. Countries 
differed systematically in the use of banks as instruments 
of economic development. As is well known, in Germany, 
Japan and eastern and central Europe, and in our own 
times, in South Korea and India,state-owned commercial 
banks played a much more actively promotional role than in 
Britain and the U.S.A. But even in the U.S.A., banks, 
often with the help of public subsidies, played a major 
role in the financing of agriculture. 
In the crisis of the 1930s, those promotional, 
specialized banks which had tied themselves to the 
interests of particular localities, regions or industries 
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were severely affected by the spreading contagion of 
financial panic (Eichengreen and Portes, 1987). Germany, 
Austria and other central European countries which had 
practised universal banking proved to be especially 
vulnerable. The failure of German debtors to meet their 
bills issued by financial institutions based in London was 
one of the factors responsible for weakening the pound 
.further in 1931 and ultimately forcing Britain off the 
gold standard (Sayers, 1976, Chapters 17 and 20). 
However, even in these crises the quality and seriousness 
of internal or international policy pursued by financial 
« 
institutions influeced the degree of damage inflicted by 
credit market failures. For example, the Standstill 
Agreement worked out by the monetary authorities of the 
major European countries may have prevented the German 
situation from deteriorating even further than it did by 
1931-33. Again, while both Austria and Hungary practised 
universal banking, Hungarian banks were less affected by 
the depression of the 1930s partly because the latter had 
been less saddled with unmarketable industrial securities 
at the start of the depression (Weber, 1991). One of the 
lessons of the depression of the 1930s is that while 
financial contagion can deepen and prolong the recession, 
prudent and co-ordinated management of the crisis by 
monetary and fiscal authorities, effective intervention by 
the monetary authorities as lenders of last resort, and 
timely dissemination of information about the real state 
of the economy can stop the credit crisis from turning 
into a melt-down of all financial institutions 
(Eichengreen and Portes, 1987; Park, 1991; Weber, 1991). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, policies pursued by the IMF 
as the international lender of last resorts and timely 
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^banks in the U.S.A. and other OECD countries are alleged 
to have moderated the possibility of financial panic and 
the collapse of the financial system. The World Bank 
(1985) had already proclaimed in 1985 that participants in 
financial markets 'responded positively and flexibly in 
coping with the debt-servicing problems of the developing 
( 2 ) 
countries'. The attempt to keep this 'durable 
structure' in place has, however, imposed burdens in terms 
of contracting incomes and world trade (Marcel and Palma, 
1988) in virtually all countries and those burdens have 
been borne primarily by the poor in terms of losses in 
jobs and earnings. They have also been unequally 
distributed as between the OECD countries, the East Asian 
NICs on the one hand, and virtually all other LDCs and 
countries of Eastern Europe on the other. Moreover, 
several developments in the 1980s definitely tended to 
increase the fragility of the financial system 
(Rybczynski, 1987; Sen, 1991). 
The first factor has been a steep rise in the real 
rates of interest all over the world, threatening the 
solvency of producing firms and credit institutions alike, 
and putting at risk all programmes of long-term 
promotional measures aimed at increasing output and 
productivity. These increases, in combination with the 
earlier low-interest saving plans of risk-averse 
households, have also pushed such credit institutions as 
the U.S. saving and loan (S & L) associations more deeply 
into the risky and volatile real estate markets, and 
caused the S & L debacle (White, 1991, Part II). Such 
debacles all over the world have put pressures on the 
domestic lenders of last resort and sometimes brought 
their credibility into question (as happened, for example, 
in case of the central bank of the Philippines under 
Marcos) . 
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It is, of course, true that in the 1930s as prices 
declined and nominal rates of interest did not fall 
proportionately or fell only with a considerable lag, real 
rates of interest also rose (Fisher, 1933; Tobin, 1987). 
But this was more an unintended consequence of deflation 
than a rise in real rates deliberately engineered by a 
major economic power to counter balance of trade deficits 
by inducing capital inflows. 
The second factor exacerbating fragility has been 
an implicit or explicit cartellization of transnational 
banks (TNBs) and international credit institutions which 
have confronted a group of borrowers, overwhelmingly from 
LDCs, who have been unable to organize in a similar 
fashion. Curiously enough, such cartellization has also 
encouraged free riding by some creditors, thus further 
increasing the costs of adjustment of LDCs and putting 
further pressure both on the international lender of last 
resort and on domestic monetary and fiscal authorities of 
the OECD countries. 
Once the process of deflation (or even sharp 
deceleration in the rate of inflation) starts, debtors 
everywhere lose out in relation to creditors. But this 
process, along with the collapse of smaller credit 
institutions, will also generally mean the concentration 
of banking assets in fewer hands. It is then likely that 
many of the smaller borrowers will be rationed out. When 
this is accompanied by a rise in the real rates of 
interest or, where TNBs are the creditors, a rise in the 
rate of interest as deflated by the real rate of exchange, 
the typical term structure of bank portfolios will shift 
towards short-term assets. (This kind of change was one of 
the driving forces behind foreign banks, followed at some 
distance by a few Indian public sector banks, misusing the 
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portfolio management scheme through placement of funds in 
the stock-market - a practice that eventually led to the 
scandal of the scam that has rocked the Indian banking 
scene since April 1992). A solution that has been sought 
by bankers and by the better-placed firms in the LDCs is 
to securitize the bank loans at an accelerated rate. Such 
securitization has in fact exaggerated the arm's length 
nature of the relationship between big banks and their 
borrowers, and has exposed an even greater share of the 
capital funds employed in industrial and other 
non-financial (and in some cases even financial) 
enterprises to the hazard of a speculative bubble. 
From the late 1970s, the problem of credit 
availability to the LDCs have been compounded by the 
initial debt overhang of the highly indebted debtors and 
the snowballing of that debt burden through rises in the 
rates of interest, continual shortening of" the spectrum of 
interest rates and the costs of tying loan repayment 
arrangements to various projects favoured by TNBs, and 
their favoured clients. 
The 1980s and the 1990s are also plagued by the 
history of the near-hegemonic presence of the U.S.A. in 
the financial world and her drastic loss of international 
competitiveness in many branches of manufacturing and 
agriculture. In 1987 it was estimated that more than 
two-thirds of 'the approximately $2.5 trillion in 
international bank claims [were] denominated in dollars. 
Moreover about three-fourths of international bond issues 
[were] denominated in dollars' (Greenspan, 1988, p. 62). 
This means that any attempt at coordination of 
international economic policy will have to reckon with US 
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domestic economic policies and the likely impact of 
efforts at international cooperation on those policies. It 
is, of course, possible as has happened in the past, that 
the managers of the domestic U.S. economy would welcome 
international initiatives in a situation in which they 
otherwise fear a stalemate or being forced to take a 
decision which is harmful in the long run (Putnam and 
Henning, 1986, as cited by Fischer, 1988). 
Apart from the imbroglio created by the huge U.S. 
debt and current account deficits, the mountainous debt 
overhang of the LDCs is no nearer vanishing into a 
molehill after the much-touted Brady and Baker 
initiatives. Most of the international bankers' moves in 
this direction have merely served to make a show of U.S. 
and OECD power and sometimes augment that power (Bagchi, 
1992b). There is plenty of historical evidence that 
bankers can get together and produce coordinated policies 
which can aggravate the problems of fundamental imbalances 
in the world economy rather than moderate them. It has « 
been recently argued that the developments leading to 
Britain adopting the gold standard in 1925 at a prewar 
parity of sterling in relation to gold and those forcing 
her off the gold standard in 1931 are striking evidence of 
the 'ordinariness' of the thinking of top bankers (Kunz, 
1991), an ordinariness that served to aggravate and 
prolong the Great Depression of the 1930s. Keynesian 
macroeconomics was born in a long struggle to free 
economics from the 'ordinariness' of bankers' logic as 
well as from the Treasury view of economic policy 
buttressed by the theory of a barter economy (see, in this 
connection, Moggridge, 1980; Skidelsky, 1988 and Clarke, 
1988) . 
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We have been witnessing another long bout of 
'ordinariness' or conventional wisdom of transnational 
bankers serving to prolong the global recession 
of the 1980s. Most of the structural adjustment policies 
forced down the threat of debtor countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa or Latin America by the IMF and the TNBs can only 
be characterized as 'beggar-my-debtor' policies - to vary 
a phrase used by Joan Robinson (1947) to characterize the 
conventional wisdom of the 1930s. The inability of the 
LDCs to keep to their extortionate repayment schedules and 
the refusal of the TNBs to lend to most LDCs on commercial 
terms also generated excess liquidity in the monetary 
system linking the OECD countries. This accelerated the 
securitization process and produced phenomena of stock 
market booms and busts without there being a quickening of 
growth in the real economy, as has been clearly brought about 
in Marcel and Palma (1988) and Sen (1991). 
4. Unequal exchanges and terms of trade variations 
Marx £1867, Part Eight) and the Marxists (e.g. 
Luxemburg, 196$; Dobb, 1946) have long discussed the 
phenomenon and the- genesis of unequal exchanges between 
town and country, between capitalist and pre-capitalist 
economies and between the metropolis and the colonies. 
This structural analysis has been organically linked with 
processes of accumulation in the metropolis and 
accompanying 'backwash effects', if not downright 
underdevelopment, in the colonies and ex-colonies (for 
summaries of the work by Marxists, neo-Marxists and world 
system or dependency theorists in this area down to the 
end of the 1970s, see Brewer, 1980, chapters 6 - 8). 
Unequal exchange has been seen as the outcome of the joint 
action of a number of causes : the use of force by 
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capitalists, especially from the metropolis, to extract 
surpluses from peasants and labourers who have been actual 
slaves or virtual serfs; the systematic denial of free 
access to markets to artisans and peasants by merchants 
and capitalists with urban and metropolitan links; the 
creation of incentive structures and 
dominance-subordination relations which have militated 
against productivity-raising investments and industrial 
transformation of the economy, and so on. Some authors, 
e.g. Emmanuel (1972) and Lewis (1978) have 
anachronistically attributed the phenomenon of unequal 
exchange entirely to differences in wages or productivity 
of labour between the colonies and the metropolis, 
ignoring the fact (a) that in colonies markets in labour 
and commodities were often neither free nor competitive 
(so that calculation schemes of the Marx-Sraffa prices of 
production are inappropriate) and (b) that the differences 
in productivity were often the creation of the 
metropolitan-colonial relationship, since while 
productivity-raising investment was a characteristic of 
metropolitan capital, colonies often suffered an erosion 
of resources, human, constructed or natural, rather than 
their augmentation (See, for critiques of the 
Emmanuel-Amin formulations of unequal exchange, Bharadwaj, 
1986 and Chandra, 1986). 
Interestingly enough, this strand of analysis has 
not been connected with the Prebisch-Singer propositions 
on long-run trends in terms of trade between primary 
producers and industrial economies or between advanced 
capitalist economies and LDCs. The proposition, put 
forward independently by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) 
that the terms of trade of primary producing countries in 
relation to those of industrialized countries have shown a 
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secular decline since the 1870s, has been debated ever 
since. The debates have concentrated rather more on 
empirical evidence for the proposition than on the 
theoretical basis of it. In the empirical tests, the 
relevance of different kinds of terms of trade - whether 
they should be terms of trade of all primary products as 
against all industrial products traded internationally, or 
• whether they should be the terms of trade of those 
countries for which the overwhelming share of exports is 
accounted for by primary products as against those for 
which manufactures constitute the major share of exports, 
or whether they should be the terms of trade of all LDCs 
defined as those for which per capita incomes fall below a 
certain level - has been debated. Along with those, 
different concepts of terms of trade - gross or net barter 
terms of trade, single or double factoral terms of trade, 
terms of trade corrected for productivity changes - have 
been advanced as the relevant concepts by different 
analysts. Furthermore, the significance of breaks in 
terms of trade movements - as during and immediately after 
the Korean War, or in the aftermath of the first OPEC 
hiking of oil prices and primary commodities, boom in the 
early 1970s - has been interpreteddifferently by different 
analysts. 
The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis is an inversion of 
the proposition derived by classical political economy 
from the alleged scarcity of natural resources that the 
prices of manufactured products will tend to decline 
relatively to those of agricultural products and that this 
mechanism would ultimately lead to a cessation of 
accumulation and growth. Many economists held on to the 
classical inference about the secular decline in the terms 
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of trade of manufactures as a kind of maintained 
hypotehsis for a very long time. But there is another 
aspect of variations of prices of primary commodities and 
thG resulting disturbances in the performance of the 
economy as a whole which had attracted the attention of 
many economists, including Keynes, at least since the end 
' of the first World War. During the war Keynes, as a 
representative of the Treasury, was a member of the Indian 
Wheat Committee set up by the Secretary of State for 
India, which sought essentially to monopolize all wheat 
exports from India and ke^p the price of wheat low. In 
one of his Manchester Guardian Commercial articles 
(Keynes, 1922), Keynes wrote about the instability of 
commodity markets, and the high costs of risk-bearing on 
the part of producers and speculators. Commodities 
continued to engross a considerable part of his time as an 
economist and investment adviser, and his occasional 
writings on the subject in the eight-odd years from 1929 
to 1938 alone occupy 300 pages (JMK, 1983, 255-647). By 
1938, Keynes had come to consider a publicly organized 
scheme for holding of buffer stocks of commodities as o 
useful auxiliary of any programme for attaining stability 
of prices and employment (Keynes, 1938). He also put 
forward schemes for international price stabiliz ation of 
commodities, with the possibility of introducing a 
currency which would be linked to international stocks of 
commodities. 
The economist who has perhaps most closely 
followed Keynes in his concern for stabilization of the 
prices and production of primary commodities is Kaldor 
(see especially Kaldor, 1963; UNCTAD, 1964, 1976; and 
Thirlwall, 1987, especially chapter 11). The case for a 
commodity-reserve currency essentially rests on the 
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problem that gold or a single reserve currency (such as 
the dollar) as the international medium of exchange 
creates for the world payments system : gold is relatively 
inelastic in supply and its mining is restricted to just 
two or three countries and so it does not respond to the 
needs of the world payments system. The problem with a 
single reserve currency is that it allows the issuer of 
the currency to pursue policies which eventually harm 
every participant in the system, and at the same time it 
imposes a burdensome obligation on the home country which 
has either to go on generating balance of payments 
deficits (thus enabling other countries to acquire the 
reserve currency) or to go on investing in their economies 
on the basis of export surpluses. Either way the 
international exchange rate of the reserve currency 
becomes unsustainable; once the currency is devalued, 
further expectations of devaluation make it less and less 
suitable as a reserve currency. A commodity reserve 
currency with diverse enough composition of ' appropriate 
commodities might get around such problems. However, I 
will not discuss the merits and demerits of such a system 
but concentrate on those aspects of the variations of 
primary product prices and the changes in their terms of 
trade in relation to manufactured products that create 
special problems for the stability of the world economy as 
a whole. 
In order to understanding peculiar problems for 
the world economy and the LDCs posed by large or sudden 
changes in primary product prices, it is necessary to 
recognize first, a difference between the primary products 
and the manufactured products in terms of flexprice and 
fixprice markets, and in terms of the differences in lags 
of adjustment of the outputs of primary products and 
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manufactured products. It is necessary further to 
recognize a difference between the organization of 
production of primary products in western Europe, the 
U.S.A., Canada, Australia and New Zealand where most of 
the primary products traded are highly capital and 
land-intensive, and where most of the GNP is derived from 
the secondary and tertiary sectors and countries in which 
the same products are produced with the help of little 
capital investment but a lot of labour and where the major 
part of the GNP and employment is still derived from the 
primary sector. A third distinction should also be made in 
respect of the marketing of primary products and 
manufactured output. : in a very large nunber of LDCs, 
exportable primary products are marketed by giant trading 
corporations based in the OECD countries such as Cargill, 
Louis Dreyfus and Co., and so on. Finally, for many, in 
fact most, LDCs, productive investment is critically 
dependent on imports of capital goods from more advanced 
economies - generally OECD countries but also from some 
countries of Eastern Europe, some East Asian NICs and some 
large LDCs such as Brazil and India. But even the latter 
are dependent critically on OECD countries for the supply 
of capital and intermediate goods for high-technology 
industries. 
Taking the difference between flexprice and 
fixprice markets, and the relative salience of the primary 
sector in generating incomes in LDCs, it can be seen that 
a fall in the prices of primary products will hit the 
incomes of primary producers. This will depress the 
demand for manufactured goods from the advanced market 
economies. If the decline in prices is expected to be 
more than temporary and the consequent deflation in 
incomes in the LDCs is also expected to be sustained, this 
will have an exaggerated impact on the exports of capital 
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goods from the OECD economies to the LDCs. It may be 
asked as to why the decline in primary product prices will 
not lead to a corresponding decline in prices and 
stimulate demand through a rise in expected profits of 
firms and nullify the effect of a decline in the terms of 
trade of producers of primary products. While such a 
possibility cannot be entirely ruled out on a priori 
grounds, it is rendered unlikely by several other 
circumstances. By now the proportion of costs of raw 
materials derived from the primary sector in the total 
costs of manufactures is quite low; the other costs such 
as labour and interest costs and so on are far more 
important and far more sticky. Moreover, there is often 
an asymmetry in responses of prices of manufactured 
products : while increases in costs tend to be matched 
relatively quickly, declines are not so quickly reflected 
in price movements. (This is rational behaviour in an 
oligopolistic industry under a wide variety of anticipated 
reactions on the part of competitors). Lastly, if the 
advanced industrial countries are already in the grip of 
competitive deflation, with competitive tightening of 
monetary policies (cf. Currie, 1993, p. 179), this will 
lead to a regime of high and increasing interest rates. 
Given all these factors, it is no surprise that Beckerman 
and Jenkinson (1986) found that in the early 1980s, while 
the decline in primary product prices had a major impact 
in moderating inflation in the OECD countries through 
changes in prices of importables, such changes were not 
accompanied by any parallel changes in prices of 
manufactured products exported by OECD countries to o n e 
another nor by any related changes in rates of wage 
inflation (see also Grubb, 1986). 
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What happens when prices of primary products go 
up, and suddenly ? Suppose the particular products are 
sold mainly by transnational corporations (TNCs) based in 
the OECD countries. In that case, in the first round, the 
effect on demand will depend on the behaviour of such 
TNCs, since most of the gains from increases in prices 
will accrue to them. If, however, the gains from 
increases in prices accrue to the owners and producers in 
LDCs, then the effect will depend on the degree of 
concentration of ownership of the land and mines which 
produce the primary products. If the ownership is 
concentrated in a few hands, then the immediate effect 
would be to increase ex ante savings rather than demand 
for consumer goods or producer goods for capital 
formation. Thus if there is a redistribution in income in 
favour of the landlords and mine-owners in LDCs as a /product 
result of a rise in primary/prices, then demand for 
manufactured goods may go down. But if ownership of the 
concerned assets is diffused among actual producers, then 
there may be no such contractionary effect. 
However, if increases in prices of primary 
products are speedily matched by increases in prices of 
manufactured products in the OECD countries and in other 
major producers of manufactures, then the stimulation 
effect on the demands for manufactures from producers of 
primary products will fail to materialize, and the demand 
in the OECD and other major producers of manufacturers 
will itself be dampened. This dampening effect will have 
longer-term implications if, because of a higher degree of 
concentration among producers of capital goods, their 
prices are raised more than proportionately. 
Thus a sudden fall or a sudden rise in prices of 
primary products may both have a recessionary effect 
on the world economy, giving' rise to the socalled 'Kaldor 
kink' (Thirlwal1, 1987, pp. 277-8). However the 
longer-term fall-out of a rise or a fall in primary 
product prices may be very different. A rise in primary 
product prices is likely to be reversed through at least 
three different kinds of mechanism. The first is 
innovation and substitution of production processes 
requiring a lesser input (per unit value of final product) 
of primary raw materials. The second is increased 
investment for the production of primary commodities by 
those primary producers who use capital-intensive 
processes and who find their profits going up as a result 
of increases in their product prices. The third is an 
extension of production of primary products through the 
intensification of labour and the mining of land and 
natural resources by those producers who use relatively 
labour-intensive methods. 
On the other hand, there is no reliable mechanism 
for re-'-er'sing the fall in primary product prices in a 
situation of world recession and a high rate of 
demographic growth. When market demand for commercial 
products is falling, real investment has become meagre, 
and yet an increasing number of persons are entering the 
labour force, the latter will try to produce more of the 
same products by using more and more labour in relation to 
virtually unchanging supplies of land and capital. It 
is to prevent such generalized recession and drastic 
impoverishment in poor countries specializing in primary 
products that the commodity reserve currency of Kaldor, 
Hart and Tinbergen (UNCTAD, 1964) was designed. A 
sensible objective of a policy of stabilizing terms of 
trade of primary products would be to allow prices of 
commodities with diminishing income elasticities of demand 
to come down gradually, while planning for a change in the 
output compostion of the economies towards products with 
high income elasticities of demand, that is, for 
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industrialization in short. 
The secular decline in terms of trade as an 
empirical fact put forward in the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis referred to earlier was one of the major 
arguments for industrialization of the LDCs in the 
postwar world. There is a considerable body of work which 
seeks to establish that there indeed was a secular decline 
in net barter and net double factoral terms of tradj of 
primary producing countries as against those of the 
advanced capitalist or industrialized economies up to the 
Second World War (Sapsford, 1985; Sarkar, 1986a and 1986b; 
Singer, 1987; Sapsford, Sarkar and ringer, 1992). It was 
also claimed that after an initial pause after the Second 
World War, this decline was resumed from 1960s, and after 
a short break in the 1970s, the decline persisted in an 
exaggerated form in the 1980s. It was also found that the 
declining terms of trade were better explained by 
specification of country groups than by specification in 
terms of commodities. Thus manufactured exports of less 
developed countries suffered a relative price decline when 
compared with the prices of manufactured imports from the 
advanced market economies (Singer, 1987; Sarkar and 
Singer, 1991). This last phenomenon can be explained by 
the easy contestability of markets for manufactures using 
older types of technology and characterised by constant, 
rather than increasing, returns to scale and the 
protectionism prevailing in advanced market economies 
against many of the manufactured exports from LDCs, 
especially textiles and garments. The prices of such 
exports from LDCs tend to go down when they are all 
competing for the same quotas restricting their import 
into OECD countries. 
I It 
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The finding of a secular decline in terms of trade 
as advanced by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis has been 
challenged repeatedly in the literature. One of the 
latest such challenges was mounted by Cuddington and 
Urzua (1989), who claimed, after using a Bex-Jenkins 
approach to the analysis of time series, that no 
deterioration in the net barter terms of trade of primary 
produces could be established for the period from 19C0 to 
1983, apart from a one-time drop in 1921. However, using 
the same kinds of methods as Cuddington and Urzua (1989) 
but with an improved specification, and without any 
prior assumption of stationarity in the time series or 
its first differences, Ardeni and Wright (1992, p. 810) 
have found that 'the inference of secular deterioration 
in the net barter terms of trade made by Prebisch and 
Singer in the 1950s appears to have been correct at that 
time, and valid for the whole century through 1988...'. 
A secular decline in the terms of trade of LDCs 
specializing in production and export of primary products 
will damage the investment prospects in such economies by 
severely limiting the capacity of the countries concerned 
to invest in the agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors since both the investible surplus and the 
capacity to import the essential capital goods and 
technology will be badly eroded. On the other side, the 
incentive to invest, especially in improved methods of 
producing the primary products themselves, will be badly 
affected. A secular decline is, of course, made up of a 
series of short-run declines. Even if there is no 
secular decline in the international prices of 
exportables and terms of trade of LDCs specialising in 
exports of primary products, if a decline in the 
corresponding prices and terms of trade is experienced 
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for a succession of years that will generate strongly 
contractionary impulses for those economies and those 
impulses will be transmitted to other economies. In the 
absence of an effective international lender of last 
resort, an inevitable result of such medium-term declines 
in prices of exportables of LDCs and accompanying 
deterioration in their terms of trade will be to damage 
their credit-worthiness as judged by TNBs and other 
sources of international credit. Once the debts of LDCs 
begin to mount, they will rapidly approach a situation 
when their credit rating falls below the level which is 
considered to be safe enough for renewal of commercial 
loans. 
In the 1980s (and earlier), purely financial 
phenomena have in turn strongly influenced variation in 
terms of trade between mainly agrarian or primary 
exporting and mainly industrialized countries dependent 
chiefly on exports of manufactures and services. In 
particular, the miring of most LDCs in external debt and 
their desparate attempts to generate more export earnings 
in falling markets have led to further declines in their 
terms of trade than would have occurred in the absence of 
such compulsions (Gilbert, 1989; Sarkar, 1991). The 
particular history of near-hegemonic dominance of the 
U.S.A. has played a role here. Most debts, even when 
owed to countries or banks domiciled in countries other 
than the U.S.A. have been denominated in dollars, and 
repayment terms have also been set in dollars. Hence 
during a major part of the 1980s, when the dollar rose in 
relation to other major currencies such as the yen or the 
mark, the rates of exchange of debt-entrapped LDCs fell 
more steeply than if the transactions had been 
denominated and carried out in hard currencies in general 
(Gilbert, 1989). In any case, even if the debts had been 
denominated in a suitably adjusted basket of hard 
currencies rather than in dollars, the compulsion to 
repay t h e debts with shortening maturities and rising 
interest rates in a situation of global recession would 
have imposed an 'excess transfer burden of debt' on LDCs 
(Sarkar, 1991). 
There is evidence that in the last cer.turv the 
forcible integration of countries such as China and India 
through a basically tributary mode of exchange between 
such economies and the metropolitan countries of the 
Nort 11 Atlantic seaboard not only impoverished then but 
also caused widespread famines since the usual survival 
strategies in the presence of harvest failures were 
greatly upset by the need to make massive transfer 
payments on the external account (Bagchi, 1979). A very 
similar phenomenon seems to be occurring in major parts 
of the African continent in the 1980s : many of these 
regions were only recently pushed or forced into the 
network of international payments before they were 
prepared for anything like equal participation in such 
networks through appropriate investments in 
infrastructure, marketing facilities, and investments 
that raised average productivity even to survival levels 
in conditions of fluctuating prices and receding 
customers. 
In his 1976 paper, Kaldor (1976) had speculated on 
the implications of a sudden break in terms of trade 
between exporters of primary products and of 
manufactures. He had prophesied that such breaks would 
cause major upsets in the international payments 
mechanism and would generate unsustainable inflationary 
or deflationary pressures. The attempt tc contain 
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inflationary pressure in OECD countries (which were only 
partially caused by rises in energy prices) proved to be 
ultimately successful. This was achieved in many OECD 
countries, as mentioned earlier, partly through a fall in 
the prices of primary products (as had also happened in 
the last thirty years of the nineteenth century) and 
partly through tight monetary policies and wage 
repression. After putting the inflationary spiral into 
reverse and causing massive unemployment and global 
impoverishment in the process (Bagchi, 1992b), 
policy-makers are still befogged as to exactly how to 
move on to an upward spiral of production and employment 
without again being caught up in competitive inflation. 
5. Conflicts between unregulated mobility of finance, 
long-term investment and expansion of the world 
economy 
In the above analysis, we have looked at those 
short and medium-term processes which can roll the world 
economy along either an expansionary or a contractionary 
path. However, the basic engine for locomotion of 
individual economies and the world economy remains 
long-term investment. In one of his last papers on 
capitalist growth, Kalecki had maintained that 'the 
long-run trend is but a slowly changing component of a 
chain of short-period situations; it has no independent 
entity1 (Kalecki, 1968, p. 165). We are now no nearer 
answering the question of exactly how investment 
decisions which result in brisk or slow growth are made 
nationally or internationally than Kalecki^as when he 
wrote his essay. But we have seen how witfy slowing down 
of investment in most OECD countries and most of the LDCs 
outside East Asia, the sustained long-run growth of the 
years 1945-1970 has become only a memory in most 
countries. 
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That a high or low rate of investment has a 
bearing on each of the three processes outlined earlier 
does not need an elaborate disquisition. Other variables 
and relations, remaining constant, a higher level of 
investment will mean a higher level of national income 
as the expenditure multiplier process works itself out. 
Credit will become more plentiful as income growth 
powered by a high and sustained level of investment 
renders loans less risky. On the other side, if a cheap 
money policy can be credibly sustained, it will make 
long-term investment more viable. A high rate of 
investment, if it is reasonably well allocated in an LDC 
starting from a position of specialization in primary 
exportables, will make such production more efficient 
with the input of better technology and better inputs. 
More importantly, it will allow it to shift the spectrum 
of outputs towards products with a high income elasticity 
of demand and capable of benefiting regularly from 
innovations at home and abroad. This will mean that even 
if the terms of trade of primary products in relation to 
manufactures were to decline, it would not hurt the 
typical LDCs individually or collectively so badly as to 
set them off on a downward spiral. 
If the international co-ordination of short-run 
policies is difficult, the co-ordination of policies 
relating to long-term investment flows is even more 
tricky. Capital, or rather finance, has generally flowed 
in directions which are perceived to have been the most 
profitable from the investor's point of view. Such 
perception has in its turn been shaped by political and 
racial factors as well as strictly economic factors. The 
pre-1917 French investment in bonds of Tsarist Russia or 
western investment in South Africa are perhaps the best 
illustrations of such proclivities. There is a long 
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tradition claiming that British foreign investment has 
often taken place at the cost of the domestic economy 
(see, for a recent analysis, supporting such a point of 
view, Kennedy, 1987). In recent years, similar opinions 
favouring the argument that capital or finance is often 
transferred from the doemstic economy of typical LDCs for 
strategic reasons or reasons of short-run expediency 
without considering the long-term health of such economies 
have been voiced in many quarters. 
The convergence of such views regarding the 
possible effects of international mobility of capital 
among economists studying advanced market economies and 
those interested in LDCs is not accidental. There is an 
inescapable conflict in the heart of the process of 
industrial capitalism itself as both Kaldor and Myrdal 
(1957) had recognized a long way back. Successful 
investment in a particular area, through the operation of 
static and dynamic economies of scale, tends to raise the 
productivity of the agents of production in those regions. 
Then capital, adult labour and entrepreneurship all tend 
to be concentrated in those favoured areas and the other 
regions acquire a deserted look. To the extent that the 
wages and infrastructure costs rise in the developed 
regions, there may be a tendency for a flow back into the 
underdeveloped regions, but generally that tendency works 
only fitfully and incompletely. Thus even developed 
market economies end up with advanced and 
backward regions. When the economies concerned are 
separated by the political barriers of different states 
and by enormous difference in language, modes of 
organization of business, levels of educational and 
infrastructural development, the problems of adjustment of 
the two economies to the chain of cumulative and 
inequalizi ng causation become even more difficult. 
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Typically, the mobility of labour as between an advanced 
market economy and an LDC is much more restricted thar. 
the mobility of capital. Thus large bodies of labour 
cannot move to take advantage of the agglomeration anc 
productivity-raising advantages of the advanced region. 
Capital can and does move to take advantage of low-wage 
labour. But low-wage labour is also usually 
low-productivity labour, especially when that labour is 
not equipped with the capital, education anc 
infrastructural facilities available in the advanced 
region. In order to raise the productivity of labour anc 
the capital equipment, it is generally necessary tc 
commit finance and plough back profits in the long run. 
But in the situation of a typical LDC, with low rates of 
captial formation and huge pools of unemployed labour, 
the owners of capital from the advanced capitalist 
country do not feel enough confidence to commit the 
finance over a long period. Thus not only the advantage 
from the full exploitation of economies from known 
technology but also the possible advantages of 
idiosyncratic and path-dependent technologies are lost. 
Nationally guided -economic policies can unduly 
impede the full exploitation of economies by fragmentary 
markets. But if the economies are large enough, and the 
governments are pursuing a sensible strategy of 
industrialization, they can provide an environment for 
the fructification of productivity-raising investment 
through commitment to a firm, an industry and a region. 
Such policies often involve a restriction on the 
international mobility of capital. But at the sacrifice 
of short-run profitability of finance, a higher rate of 
return to all the factors, not excluding capital, coulc 
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be achieved through such a short-run sacrifice. This kind 
of resolution of conflict is not guaranteed, but it is 
not unthinkable either. 
Unrestricted international mobility of capital 
with more and more restrictions on the mobility of labour 
as between LDCs and advanced market economies has badly 
- damaged the prospects of productivity-raising investment 
and growth in all LDCs and all advanced market economies. 
There are no easy ways out of the three-way conflict 
between the requirements of long-term commitment of 
finance for productivity-raising investment policies for 
easing the transition of losing regions or economies to 
adjustment with lower population levels but at higher 
levels of productivity, and the demands of footloose 
finance in search of the highest returns at any point of 
time. But uncoordinated investment flows and unrestricted 
international mobility of capital have proved to be highly 
inimical to global economic growth and stability and 
especially to the growth and stability of LDCs. 
Even many mainstream theorists (such as Dornbusch, 
1990) have recognized that uncontrolled mobility of 
finance is a major destabilizing force in foreign 
exchange markets. Since variations in foreign exchange 
rates and sudden flights of capital have created an 
atmosphere of greatly enhanced uncertainty and induced 
speculation, the socalled securitization of investment 
has not at all served the cause of long-term investment. 
It is not accidental that the two economies of Germany 
and Japan with carefully segmented capital and money 
markets did much better in terms of economic growth 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s than the two countries of 
the U.K. and U.S.A. which put the demands of finance and 
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unification of capital and money markets at the top of 
the agenda (cf. Mullins and Wadhwani, 1989). However, 
even as major strands in the work of mainstream 
economists are pointing towards public intervention and 
public, internationally coordinated regulation of 
international trade (Bagchi, 1992a), the trend of 
orthodox policymakers' opinion still favours 
liberalization of external trade and payments, without 
putting in any blockages to prevent a world financial and 
economic meltdown. If I were to speculate about the shape 
of things for which policymakers should strive cn a 
global basis, it would be to try to put finance at the 
service of industry rather than industry and all 
long-sighted productive enterprise at the service cf 
short-sighted footloose finance. As I have argued 
above, a basic conflict lies at the heart of capitalist 
rules of the game. While profit-maximization dictates 
looking for the highest gain at every moment of time 
without looking any further, long-term productivity 
growth requires a commitment to a particular enterprise, 
location, and a particular way of organizing the 
firm-specific and social division of labour (including 
that relating to innovations and productive adaptation). 
One of the worst casualties of the current 
xkxxwcmxx scenario is likely to be R & D in most countries 
which are not favoured by footloose finance. If the 
proposals mooted by Mr. Arthur Dunkel of the GATT are 
accepted they will sound a deathknell for R i D 
activities which are needed not only for innovation but 
also for learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1991). It is by 
defying the rules of footloose finance that such 
countries as Japan and Germany have been able to build up 
their formidable competitiveness in manufacturing. It is 
remarkable that even while Japan's firms were thriving cn 
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high gearing ratios, the giant Japanese banks were' much 
less profitable than their British and American 
counterparts (Corbett, 1990). It is also worth noting 
that Japanese TNBs have not proved particularly 
successful in local banking outside their home ground in 
Japan and East Asia. So international competitive 
advantage in manufacturing does not get automatically 
translated into competitive advantage in financial 
markets, even if a country succeeds in generating huge 
external surpluses. It is, of course, not obvious that 
the world can be organized as a group of Japans Inc. 
without running into even greater and more difficult 
conflicts of interest between capitalist countries than 
we have witnessed. But continuing to obey the current 
shabby rules of the game set by transnational bankers and 
speculators in foreign exchange markets is no way to put 
the three basic processes outlined above working for 
global enrichment rather than global impoverishment and 
global disaster in the shape of famines, wars, pervasive 
criminality and an ecological Armageddon. 
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F O O T N O T E S 
1. For references to the literature on the foreign 
trade multiplier upto 1947, see Ellis and Metzler, 
1949, pp. 596-7; for a survey which takes into 
account most of the theoretical work on the 
foreign trade multiplier and its empirical 
implementation upto 1985, see Gandolfo, 1987, 
chapter 13. 
2. For a critique of the IMF-World Bank view of 
international economic policy, see Bagchi, 1990. 
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I am indebted to G.C. Harcourt and Laurence Harris 
for detailed comments. Participants in a conference on 
Global Finance held under the auspices of the Mai'son des 
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useful comments on an earlier version. I alone, however, 
remain responsible for any errors in the paper. 
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